Tell 'em, pt. 1

The crux of Zippy's argument is his claim that the "harm done to the person and those around him in voting for a candidate who supports murdering the innocent... far, far outweighs any influence one's vote has over the outcome in national elections." If the good effect of influencing the outcome in national elections is disproportionately small compared to the bad effect of the harm done to the voter (to say nothing of the evil being cooperated with), then it is contrary to prudence to vote that way.

But is his claim true?

It seems to me that it is not, that he is wrong about both the harm done and the good sought.

On the harm done, there are two possible kinds of harm: harm that necessarily follows from voting for a candidate who supports murdering the innocent; and harm that unnecessarily follows.

Unnecessary harm includes things like telling yourself or others that a candidate who supports murdering the innocent really is pro-life, or that the kinds or numbers of murders he supports really don't matter. It's getting used to saying, "There is no cannibalism in my party, absolutely none," and forgetting that when you say "none" you mean there is a certain amount.

Unnecessary harm is bad stuff indeed, and when present can certainly throw all moral calculus out of whack. But it isn't necessarily present.

I understand Zippy's position to be that much of what I consider unnecessary harm actually does follow necessarily from voting for a candidate who supports murdering the innocent. But I cannot see how that position is not one of begging the question. It's a tautology that repeatedly voting for candidates who support murdering the innocent habituates the voter to voting for candidates who support murdering the innocent. But that habituation is bad if and only if the voter ought not vote for those candidates, which is precisely the question being debated. If in each individual case it's morally acceptable to vote that way, then it's a morally acceptable habit that is being developed; if not, not.

Zippy has also proposed scandal as a possible harm: maybe I am virtuous enough to vote for a candidate who supports murdering the innocent without doing moral harm to myself, but I run the risk of causing others to vote for that candidate who will do themselves moral harm.

But I certainly can't scandalize anyone by casting a secret ballot; the scandal could only occur through my observable actions. A strict answer to the scandal objection is to simply not talk about my voting intentions; a sufficient answer is to only talk with prudence (which, obviously, is true regardless of the topic).

There remains a certain residual necessary harm to the voter's psyche in making a lousy choice when faced with a worse choice. But not only is this sort of harm part of the Christian's daily cross, by construction -- since we assume the voter made what he judged to be the best available choice -- the harm would be even greater had the voter made a different choice.

In sum, then, while it's entirely possible (and arguable common) to incur spiritual harm by voting for a candidate who supports murdering the innocent, it is not necessary, and in fact voting for a candidate who supports murdering the innocent may inflict less harm on the voter than any alternative.

Labels: Contra Zippy, faithful citizenship, Pro Sufferage

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