We haven't reached disagreement about torture yet

Mark Shea writes about "more wearying attempts to avoid the bleeding obvious" about the CIA enhanced interrogation program. It could also be called the same wearying attempt that's been repeated over and over for a dozen years.

Directly countering a bad argument rarely changes the mind of the one offering the bad argument. It might, though, sway an undecided onlooker.

But if I might introduce one of my King Charles's heads into the discussion, I wonder if part of the problem is that a lot of people think of morality in terms of rules. If your idea of a good Catholic is a Catholic who follows the rules, and you are or try to be a good Catholic yourself, then you'll want to follow the rule, "Torture is prohibited."

If you've ever met a human being, you know what we do to rules. We get around them when we want to. "Torture is prohibited" offers two broad avenues for getting around. To the left we have "torture" and the endless arguments about definitions and fine lines and boundaries and splashing water in faces and making prisoners uncomfortable for a few hours. To the right we have "prohibited" and the endless arguments about exceptions and circumstances and differences in objectives and historical examples that overthrow the soft-hearted heresies of the last fifty years.

The arguments are endless because the counterarguments don't get at the actual point of disagreement. The one side says, "The rule 'Torture is prohibited' has not been broken," while the other side says, "No! Torture is objectively evil!"

If that's right, then the way out isn't to keep showing the logical weaknesses of the one side. It's to walk them past the rule-based morality to the more fundamental questions of virtues, vices, and the goods of human nature. Find some behavior everyone in the conversation agrees to call torture, find out whether everyone in the conversation agrees that that behavior is objectively evil and therefore always prohibited, and then -- rather than testing the rule just agreed to with real-world or hypothetical examples -- go into why that behavior is objectively evil, what makes it everywhere and always contrary to the good of a human being and God's will for him.

If you can get that far, then you can start looking at other real-world or hypothetical examples, not for whether they follow the rule, but for whether they are objectively evil. And when you reach disagreement, you have a chance of understanding why.

Labels: Breaking the Rules, How to dispute, On torture

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Full spectrum

The diagram in my previous post is incomplete, emphasizing the self-serving nature of some of the justification of the CIA's enhanced interrogation program.

Here's a diagram that shows all eight possibilities given the three questions "Is waterboarding torture?", "Is torture evil?", and "Is waterboarding evil?" (You're right, the purple region is logically incoherent; if you get a yes to the first two questions, nothing good will come from asking the third.)

Special pleading in defense of the CIA program lies inside the yellow region. "Sure, torture is evil, but waterboarding isn't torture, so/and waterboarding isn't evil."

A good number of people spend a good amount of time arguing that waterboarding isn't torture (the gray, red, orange, and yellow regions). Since my earlier question hasn't garnered much of a response, let me rephrase it:

If you insist the term "torture" be so narrowly defined that it excludes waterboarding, then what term do you use for the more general category of evil behavior that encompasses both torture and waterboarding?

This question will be question-begging for those in the gray, red, and yellow regions. I intend it to be. The purpose of the question is to come up with a way of talking to the people in the orange region, who from my perspective are playing semantic games that serve principally as material support of grave evil. Addressing the moral or intellectual failings of those outside the orange region requires a different tack.

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What clouds the vision

Waterboarding was easily recognized as torture when it was committed by those savage Spaniards, and by those savage Filipinos, and by those savage Japanese, and by those savage Germans, and by those savage French, and by those savage Vietnamese, and by those savage Cambodians, and by those savage South Africans. It was even easily recognized as torture when it was committed by savage Americans acting contrary to orders.

Somehow, it's only people who feel they personally benefit from it, and who don't think of themselves as favoring torture, who can't see that waterboarding is torture.

Labels: On torture

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Tout comprendre

I say, if you don't understand something, ask about it.

So, to those who still deny that waterboarding is torture, or who say that it's hard to say whether waterboarding is torture, let me ask:

What the hell is wrong with you?

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"It is about who we are"

A speech this morning on the U.S. Senate floor by Senator John McCain:



Excerpt:

In fact, not only did the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed not provide us with key leads on bin Laden's courier, Abu Ahmed; it actually produced false and misleading information...

I have sought further information from the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and they confirm for me that, in fact, the best intelligence gained from a CIA detainee — information describing Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti's real role in Al-Qaeda and his true relationship to Osama bin Laden — was obtained through standard, non-coercive means, not through any "enhanced interrogation technique."

In short, it was not torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees that got us the major leads that ultimately enabled our intelligence community to find Osama bin Laden. I hope former Attorney General Mukasey will correct his misstatement. It's important that he do so because we are again engaged in this important debate, with much at stake for America's security and reputation. Each side should make its own case, but do so without making up its own facts.

This is a follow-up to his op-ed that ran in the Washington Post this morning, in which he writes:

Individuals might forfeit their life as punishment for breaking laws, but even then, as recognized in our Constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, they are still entitled to respect for their basic human dignity, even if they have denied that respect to others.

All of these arguments have the force of right, but they are beside the most important point. Ultimately, this is more than a utilitarian debate. This is a moral debate. It is about who we are.

[Links via The Plum Line.]

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Next year's dilemma is this year's false dilemma

A few responses to a few responses to my post below that asked what the hell is wrong with Republican Catholics (some of these responses were eaten during this week's Blogger.com flu):

1. That a candidate may not agree that waterboarding is torture is irrelevant to the question of whether he supports torture. If anything, that he supports torture without realizing it is grounds for rejecting a candidate as too muddle-headed for the job.

2. And yes, the Church has not officially taught that waterboarding is torture. But I'm not stating that waterboarding is torture because it's Catholic doctrine. I'm stating it because it's true.

3. My issue here is not with politicians. My issue here is with Roman Catholics who enthusiastically endorse politicians who advocate grave evil. If Catholics didn't vote for these politicians, they wouldn't be politicians anymore, they'd be cable news pundits. As Anita Moore says in a comment below:

We're not going to get candidates who don't advocate grave evil until we repent, convert and otherwise straighten up.

4. The proportionality argument -- that the other party's grave evils are much more grave and evil than our party's -- is a complete nonstarter.

Let me retype that, since the proportionality argument ("70% Less Evil Than The Other Leading Brand!") is a popular one:

Whether torture is a less important issue than abortion is completely irrelevant today.

Today is May 14, 2011. The general election for U.S. President is a year and a half away. The ballots have not yet been printed. There is no choice to be made today between a candidate who supports torture and a candidate who supports abortion.

Again: There is no choice to be made today between a candidate who supports torture and a candidate who supports abortion.

The choice to be made today is whether I am satisfied with choosing between a candidate who supports torture and a candidate who supports abortion.

Labels: faithful citizenship, On torture, The lesser evil is still evil

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Consequentialism, specifically

A while back, I suggested that, a) while there may not be any textbook solipsists out there over the age of nineteen -- people who believe they are the only beings that exist, and that they are just imagining everyone and everything else; b) there are a lot of people who act as though they are the only being that exists, or at least the only one that counts; and c) we can call these people solipsists, too.

I am reminded of this by a sentence in the statement of Fr. Brian Harrison, OS, posted on Catholic and Enjoying It! yesterday. (Yes, it's all in the context of the torture debate, but I'm not now writing on that debate as such.)

After allowing that Marc Thiessen is mistaken on his ideas of pacifism and the principle of double effect, Fr. Harrison adds:

Nevertheless, I regard as manifestly unjust the accusation that Thiessen is guilty of "consequentialism" in a sense that would involve dissent from any teachings of the Church's magisterium.

Having myself accused Thiessen of consequentialism, this statement interests me.

I think the teachings of the Church's magisterium Fr. Harrison has in mind come chiefly from Veritatis Splendor, which says that consequentialism "maintain[s] that it is never possible to formulate an absolute prohibition of particular kinds of behaviour" [n 75, emphasis added], and that consequentialist theories "are not faithful to the Church's teaching, when they believe they can justify, as morally good, deliberate choices of kinds of behaviour contrary to the commandments of the divine and natural law."

Now, it is simply a fact that Marc Thiessen maintains that it is possible to formulate an absolute prohibition of particular kinds of behavior. Insofar as consequentialism maintains the opposite, he is an anti-consequentialist.

This raises the question, how far is that? In other words, how much does "consequentialism" imply that it is never possible to absolutely prohibit any kind of behavior?

I suggest that, in the walk-about world of people as we find them, the answer is, "Not much."

Consequentialism is different from solipsism in that there do seem to be textbook consequentialists who do insist the morality of every act depends solely on a calculation of foreseeable consequences (see VS 75).

But few people have such categorical moral views, whether consequentialist or otherwise. Most people, I think, have a patchwork moral system, partly rigorous and inviolable, partly highly flexible, partly lies told to children. An academic theologian looking for academic consequentialism will not find much outside the academy; in particular, he's unlikely to find it in a person who "didn't get into the Catholic theological stuff of [waterboarding] until I sat down to write the book" defending it.

Let me propose that "consequentialism" may be used as a generic term, referring to the act of judging the morality of an act solely from its consequences. This is a broader sense than is found in VS, but I'm looking at the question, "Is it true?," not, "Is it dissent from any teachings of the Church's magisterium?"

I will further propose two specific types of consequentialism: doctrinal or textbook consequentialism, the formal moral system described and condemned in VS; and common or garden consequentialism, the unsystematic application of consequentialist reasoning to particular moral questions. We might also call these "consequentialism of conviction" and "consequentialism of convenience," respectively. (Or maybe we trash the species of consequentialism line and say the former is the habit and the latter the act?)

If we may call an individual act of judging the morality of an act solely from its consequences an act of consequentialism, then it doesn't follow that someone is not a consequentialist if he is not one in the sense that would involve dissent from any teachings of the Church's magisterium.

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Yeesh

Jean Bethke Elshtain is kind of a big deal in political philosophy. She is not, however, a moral theologian, nor is she Catholic, so she makes an odd source for Marc Thiessen to quote (introducing her as "one of America's great moral theologians") in explaining the Catholic moral concept of casuistry.

Still, the author gets to choose his own sources, and if his editor okays it he's good to go.

Now, though, I read this in a New York Times's article about the Thiessen affair:

Jean Bethke Elshtain, of the University of Chicago, said that while soldiers or politicians might have to commit necessary evils sometimes, they "still stand convicted before God, if you are thinking theologically."

"The necessary evil means precisely that: it is both 'necessary' and 'evil,'" she said. "So the worst thing that can happen is to make something like waterboarding legally acceptable."

Assuming the reporter didn't mangle it (and from that last sentence, mangling what comes before is a distinct possibility), Professor Elshtain thinks something can be both necessary and evil.

So we have a political speechwriter who doesn't know what "wrong" means turning to a political philosopher who doesn't know what "evil" means for moral instruction.

And what do you know? Waterboarding wins!

(NYT link via Coalition for Clarity.)

Labels: On torture

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Torture's not so bad!

It would seem that American-style waterboarding of prisoners for information is not torture. Torture causes persistent physical and/or psychological damage to the victim. But American-style waterboarding of prisoners for information does not cause persistent physical and/or psychological damage to the victim. Therefore, American-style waterboarding of prisoners for information is not torture.

I reply, torture is physical or moral violence directed against the bodily integrity of the victim, as the Catechism of the Catholic Church says (n. 2297). But offenses against bodily integrity need not cause persistent effects, as is shown by the fact that kidnapping and hostage-taking are also offenses against the bodily integrity of the victim, and they need cause persistent effects no more than waterboarding. So the absence of persistent effects is not proof that an act is not torture.

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A speculation: People often think of torture as necessarily causing persistent injury because most methods of torture actually do, or at least can, cause persistent injury. The combination of a will to torture and a will to avoid persistent injury is relatively rare in history.

An observation: I didn't mention this in my reply because it's not necessary to refute the argument in the first paragraph, but: The truth of that argument's other premise -- "American-style waterboarding of prisoners for information does not cause persistent physical and/or psychological damage to the victim" -- is by no means established. In particular, it is not established by anecdotal accounts of American-style waterboarding of SERE trainees, for two reasons. First, among the many circumstantial differences between waterboarding prisoners and waterboarding trainees is the difference in relationship between the waterboarder and the waterboardee, and among the differences that follow from the difference in relationship is that being waterboarded is a different psychological experience for a prisoner than it is for a trainee. The second reason anecdotal accounts of SERE trainees does not establish that prisoners do not suffer persistent injury is that some anecdotal accounts of SERE trainees include persistent psychological injury.

UPDATED with an observation.

Labels: On torture

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To those Catholic Democrats Republicans who think abortion torture is chiefly used as an excuse to vote for those wicked Republicans Democrats,

I have a question and an observation.

The question: What does it say about your party that this is an issue that could be used as an excuse to vote for the other party?

The observation: Your party can make it go away as a political issue by explicitly and meaningfully rejecting any endorsement of it.

Labels: On torture

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A general objection

It would seem that American-style waterboarding of prisoners is not torture. American-style waterboarding of prisoners is specified by the object of pouring water into the nose and mouth of a person. This is the same object as American-style waterboarding of SERE trainees, and American-style waterboarding of SERE trainees is not considered wrong in itself, much less torture. Since they share the same object, and differ only in circumstances and intention, they must share the same objective moral quality. And since American-style waterboarding of SERE trainees is regarded as objectively moral, so must American-style waterboarding of prisoners be regarded as objectively moral. But torture is objectively immoral, as the United States Catholic Catechism for Adults says. Therefore, American-style waterboarding of prisoners cannot be regarded as torture.

I reply, a description of the object of an act is not necessarily identical to the object itself. The description may be too general, encompassing multiple acts with different specific ends, as for example "undue foretelling of the future" describes both divination by dreams and divination by demons, which are two distinct acts that are further specified by the circumstances through which the foretelling occurs. The description may also be too narrow, failing to specify any proper end or set of ends of the will; this happens, for example, if the description is excessively physical, as with "to push someone," which is only a part of multiple distinct objects such as "to help someone by pushing them" and "to injure someone by pushing them."

Thus, the fact that the objects of both American-style waterboarding of SERE trainees and American-style waterboarding of prisoners can be described as "to pour water into the nose and mouth of a person" does not demonstrate that they are the same species of moral act, nor prove that American-style waterboarding of prisoners is not torture. In particular, it seems to be an example of a too-narrow description that fails to specify one or more proper ends of the will, as waterboarding for training would seem to be an act related to fortitude and waterboarding for interrogation of prisoners an act related to justice.

UPDATED for brevity and (one hopes) general improvement.

Labels: On torture

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A basic review

Professional torture apologist¹ Marc Thiessen likes to quote a salacious passage² from Henry Charles Lea's A History of the Inquisition of Spain as a way of demonstrating that "even a remote comparison" between what the Bush Administration (in which Thiessen worked as a speechwriter) did to its prisoners and what the Spanish Inquisition did to its prisoners is a "canard," a "ridiculous argument" that "even a basic review of the facts makes clear" can only be made by someone "completely uninformed."

Here's the full passage:

The water-torture was more complicated. The patient was placed on an escalera or potro
	--a kind of trestle, with sharp-edged rungs across it like a ladder.
It slanted so that the head was lower than the feet and,
	at the lower end was a depression in which the head sank,
while an
	iron
band around the forehead or throat kept it immovable.
	Sharp cords, called cordeles, which cut into the flesh, attached the arms and legs to the side of the trestle and others, known as garrotes, from sticks thrust in them and twisted around like a tourniquet till the cords cut more or less deeply into the flesh, were twined around the upper and lower arms, the thighs and the calves; a bostezo, or iron prong, distended the mouth,
a toca, or strip of linen,	was thrust down the throat
to conduct water trickling slowly from a jarra or jar, holding usually a little more than a quart. The patient strangled and gasped and suffocated and, at intervals, the toca was withdrawn and he was adjured to tell the truth.
	The severity of the infliction was measured by the number of jars consumed, sometimes reaching to six or eight.

The right-hand column contains the bits that, I assume, Thiessen thinks justifies his claim:

Needless to say, none of this even remotely resembles what was done by the CIA.

The left-hand column contains the bits that resemble what was done by the CIA. If that's too many words, let me edit it down to this:

The patient strangled and gasped and suffocated....

What explains his need to make, repeatedly, the laughable claim that pouring water into the nose and throat of a man strapped upside down to a table doesn't even remotely resemble pouring water into the nose and throat of a man strapped upside down to a trestle?

I've already mentioned Thiessen's consequentialism, though I should add that, as far as I can tell, he is at least a sincere consequentialist. That is, he seems to honestly believe that, if waterboarding saves lives, then it can't be wrong. (I contrast this with a cynical consequentialism, according to which, if waterboarding saves lives, then who cares whether it's wrong.)

And so we find him making statements like this:

I feel obligated to respond, to defend the honor of the courageous men and women of the CIA who kept us safe and who cannot defend themselves.

For a consequentialist, honorable end implies honorable means -- and honorable human beings.

Having started down this path, though, the cordeles can only tighten. If the CIA agents Thiessen has spoken to had good intentions -- and I have no reason to doubt their good intentions -- then they are honorable people, and if honorable people do honorable things, then what they did can't be dishonorable, so what they did can't be torture. And if what they did can't be torture, then what makes "water-torture" torture can't be the water, can't be the strangling and gasping and suffocating, so it must be the cruelty with which the victim is held in place.

And if a moment's thought shows how ridiculous that is, then a moment's thought shows that these honorable people did something dishonorable. But that's impossible, so a moment's thought is impossible, so a moment's thought must be avoided by declaring the thought a canard, ridiculous, completely uninformed, near-perfect ignorance.

The result is a best-selling apologist for torture whose argument reduces to, "Is not, is not, is not!"

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1. Marc Thiessen would deny being a torture apologist, because he denies waterboarding is torture. I see no reason to follow him in his confusion. That he is a professional apologist he can't deny, since he's written an apologetical book on the subject.

2. It's a small point, but let me make it: Henry Charles Lea, though a respected historian of his day, wrote with a marked anti-Catholic bias. Thiessen, then, would have us compare a description of one activity written by someone biased against the organization sponsoring it with a description of a similar activity written by someone biased in favor of the organization sponsoring it. This is not to say either description is inaccurate, merely that the author's bias will naturally affect the description given, and that comparison between two descriptions ought to account for these differences.

Labels: On torture

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The Understanding of Moral Acts for Adults

The United States Catholic Catechism for Adults offers a take on the three elements characterizing moral acts that may be a bit easier to grasp than the Catechism of the Catholic Church's presentation.

Under "Life in Christ/The Foundations of Christian Morality/We are Moral Beings: Fundamental Elements of Christian Morality," we find the subsection "The Understanding of Moral Acts":

Another important foundation of Christian morality is the understanding of moral acts. Every moral act consists of three parts: the objective act (what we do), the subjective goal or intention (why we do the act), and the concrete situation or circumstances in which we perform the act (where, when, how, with whom, the consequences, etc.)

For an individual act to be morally good, the object, or what we are doing, must be objectively good. Some acts, apart from the intention or reason for doing them, are always wrong because they go against a fundamental or basic human good that ought never to be compromised. Direct killing of the innocent, torture, and rape are examples of acts that are always wrong. Such acts are referred to as intrinsically evil acts, meaning that they are wrong in themselves, apart from the reason they are done or the circumstances surrounding them.

The goal, end, or intention is the part of the moral act that lies within the person. For this reason, we say that the intention is the subjective element of the moral act. For an act to be morally good, one's intention must be good. If we are motivated to do something by a bad intention -- even something that is objectively good -- our action is morally evil. It must also be recognized that a good intention cannot make a bad action (something intrinsically evil) good. We can never do something wrong or evil in order to bring about a good. This is the meaning of the saying, "the end does not justify the means." (cf. CCC, nos. 1749-1761)

The circumstances and the consequences of the act make up the third element of moral action. These are secondary to the evaluation of a moral act in that they contribute to increasing or decreasing the goodness or badness of the act. In addition, the circumstances may affect one's personal responsibility for the act. All three aspects must be good -- the objective act, the subjective intention, and the circumstances -- in order to have a morally good act.

This teaching, which recognizes both the objective and subjective dimension of morality, is often at odds with a perspective that views morality as a completely personal or merely subjective reality. In such a view, held by some in our culture, there are no objective norms capable of demanding our moral compliance. Such a denial of an objective and unchanging moral order established by God results in a vision of morality and moral norms as being a matter of personal opinion or as established only through the consent of the individual members of society.

What I like about this way of putting it is its relative simplicity. "What we do" and "why we do it" are things we're used to thinking about. And emphasizing "both the objective and subjective dimension of morality" is important these days, as the Catechism says.

The price of simplicity is, in part, that it leaves unspoken how to decide what "what we do" is. But at least stating the independent objectivity of what we do shows that it is not wholly fungible, and hints at the possibility that what we say we are doing, or even what we think we are doing, isn't objectively the case.

Labels: On torture

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Definitely not

If the Catechism can't be used to say torture is only wrong if it is used "to extract confessions, punish the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred," can it at least be used to say that torture is only torture if it is used for one of those reasons?

In other words, can it be interpreted as defining torture as "the use of physical or moral violence to either extract confessions, or punish the guilty, or frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred," with the implication that the use of physical or moral violence for any other reason isn't torture, and therefore isn't covered by the many, many ecclesial statements that torture is wrong?

No.

The reason it can't be interpreted along those lines is simple: It's not a definition consistent with any known concept of torture.

Consider this question: Is the use of thumbscrews on a prisoner, to the point of leaving him writhing in pain, torture? If the above interpretation [that the Catechism defines torture in reference to an exclusive and precise list of reasons] were valid, then the answer to that question would be, "It depends."

But no one thinks the answer to that question is, "It depends." So if the above interpretation were valid, the Church would be redefining a term in a way inconsistent with every other usage of that term, offering this idiosyncratic (to say the least) definition in one place only, sandwiched between mention of terrorism and amputations, neither of which it defines, and then (according to the interpretation) using the word equivocally -- without so much as a hint that there is a bizarre and inconsistent definition -- in the Compendium of the Catechism, in local catechisms, in papal speeches, in letters to Congress.

All of that is absurd. Therefore, the idea that the Catechism is defining torture in a restricted sense is also absurd.

If the Catechism isn't defining torture, though, what's all that stuff about "to extract confessions, punish the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred" doing there?

It seems to me that it functions, not as a formal definition, but as a working description of torture. As a description, it characterizes torture without specifying it. It states the sort of thing torture is and the sorts of things it's used for, in general terms that are nevertheless sufficient to show that torture is not simply any sort of real or perceived mistreatment or punishment.

Labels: On torture

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An adult interpretation

For years, people have been interpreting that one statement in CCC 2297 --

Torture which uses physical or moral violence to extract confessions, punish the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred is contrary to respect for the person and for human dignity.

-- as implying that torture for reasons other than those listed -- in particular, for interrogation of someone assumed to have information that can save lives -- might not be contrary to respect for the person and for human dignity.

As it stands, it's a mighty sketchy interpretation. It asserts that there's nothing objectively or circumstantially contrary to respect for the person and for human dignity to torture a prisoner. All you need is a good enough reason. (And what do you know? The reason people today might want to torture prisoners just happens to be a good reason! These interpreters will, though, stipulate that other reasons -- to save face after you were double-dog dared to torture the prisoner, say, or to get someone who loves the victim to talk -- are immoral.)

I haven't seen anyone even try to explain why it's contrary to respect for the person and for human dignity to torture a murderer, but not contrary to those things to torture a would-be murderer. The problem here is that torture isn't evil because it's icky, in which case it wouldn't be evil when not torturing would be ickier. Torture is evil, according to the Catechism, because it's contrary to respect for the person of the victim, and the respect due the person of the victim doesn't change based on what you want to get out of torturing him.^*

So, as I say, we have an interpretation that really doesn't hold up on its own terms. The fact that the very next paragraph of the Catechism contradicts this interpretation should settle the matter:

In times past, cruel practices were commonly used by legitimate governments to maintain law and order... In recent times it has become evident that these cruel practices were neither necessary for public order, nor in conformity with the legitimate rights of the human person... It is necessary to work for their abolition.

But someone who is capable of interpreting CCC 2297 as allowing torture for good reason is capable of interpreting CCC 2298 the same way. (Or of interpreting it away altogether; it's printed in a smaller font, you know.)

Okay, but maybe the Catechism really is ambiguous on this point. What else do we have?

We have the Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which, according to Pope Benedict XVI, "is a faithful and sure synthesis of the Catechism of the Catholic Church." Per the CCCC:

477. What practices are contrary to respect for the bodily integrity of the human person?

They are: kidnapping and hostage taking, terrorism, torture, violence, and direct sterilization. Amputations and mutilations of a person are morally permissible only for strictly therapeutic medical reasons.

Okay, but maybe when it says "torture," it means "and sometimes torture."

We have Pope John Paul II, speaking to the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1982:

And as regards torture, the Christian is confronted from the beginning with the account of the passion of Christ. The memory of Jesus exposed, struck, treated with derision in his anguished sufferings, should always make him refuse to see a similar treatment applied to one of his brothers in humanity. Christ's disciple refuses every recourse to such methods, which nothing could justify and in which the dignity of man is as much debased in his torturer as in the torturer's victim.

Okay, but maybe that was just the Pope expressing his personal opinion that torture is categorically wrong, with some dodgy translation from the French.

The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church -- "which, according to the request received from the Holy Father, has been drawn up in order to give a concise but complete overview of the Church's social teaching" -- quotes Pope John Paul II's 1982 speech:

In carrying out investigations, the regulation against the use of torture, even in the case of serious crimes, must be strictly observed: "Christ's disciple refuses every recourse to such methods, which nothing could justify and in which the dignity of man is as much debased in his torturer as in the torturer's victim." International juridical instruments concerning human rights correctly indicate a prohibition against torture as a principle which cannot be contravened under any circumstances.

Okay, but maybe they're only talking about investigations of crimes that have already happened, not of crimes that are ongoing or yet to occur.

"Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship" states:

Other direct assaults on innocent human life and violations of human dignity, such as genocide, torture, racism, and the targeting of noncombatants in acts of terror or war, can never be justified.

Okay, but maybe this is just some USCCB cubicle dweller's idea.

"Torture is a Moral Issue: A Catholic Study Guide" states that:

"In the Church's eyes [t]orture violates a human person's God-given dignity."

Okay, but maybe this is just some USCCB cubicle dweller's idea.

Statements by American bishops on behalf of the USCCB include the following categorical rejections of torture:

We believe that a respect for the dignity of every person, ally or enemy, must serve as the foundation of the pursuit of security, justice and peace. There can be no compromise on the moral imperative to protect the basic human rights of any individual incarcerated for any reason... We share the concerns of lawmakers and citizens for the safety of U.S. soldiers and civilians abroad in these times of great uncertainty and danger. In the face of this perilous climate, our nation must not embrace a morality based on an attitude that "desperate times call for desperate measures" or "the end justifies the means." The inherent justice of our cause and the perceived necessities involved in confronting terrorism must not lead to a weakening or disregard of U.S. and international law. -- Bishop Ricard, Chairman, USCCB Committee on International Policy, October 4, 2005

A respect for the dignity of every person, ally or enemy, must serve as the foundation of security, justice and peace. There can be no compromise on the moral imperative to protect the basic human rights of any individual incarcerated for any reason... In a time of terrorism and fear, our individual and collective obligations to respect dignity and human rights, even of our worst enemies, gains added importance. -- Bishop Wenski, Chairman, USCCB Committee on International Policy, December 17, 2007

We are opposed to any proposed or adopted legislation or other actions that would appear to once again decriminalize torture and abusive conduct. We believe any legislation adopted by the Congress must be unambiguous in rejecting torture and cruel treatment as dangerous, unreliable and illegal. -- Bishop Wenski, Chairman, USCCB Committee on International Policy, January 30, 2008

Torture undermines and debases the human dignity of both victims and perpetrators. It is never a necessary cruelty. -- Cardinal George, President, USCCB, March 5, 2008

Okay, but maybe ... um....

And last, we have the United States Catechism for Adults, which is the "local catechism" written by the bishops of the United States using the CCC as "a sure and authentic reference text," and which received the recongitio of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith. The U.S. Catechism for Adults includes this statement:

Direct killing of the innocent, torture, and rape are examples of acts that are always wrong.

So: No.

Torture is always wrong.

The Catholic Church teaches that torture is always wrong.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches that torture is always wrong.

Interpretations to the contrary are wrong.

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* It's always a "him," right? Torture is a very manly thing, for advocates, with manly men torturing wormy men, so that girly men may sleep safely at night.

Labels: faithful citizenship, On torture

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Priorities

A great deal has been, is being, and will be said about what the word "torture" means.

Perhaps, though, we should be more concerned about making sure everyone knows what the word "wrong" means.

Mark Thiessen, for example, clearly doesn't know:

[Critics of waterboarding] have to argue that a) enhanced interrogation is wrong and b) it did not work, because if the latter is not true then the deaths of thousands of innocent men, women, and children would have been the price of their approach.

If something is wrong, then it's wrong even if means deaths of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.

If, like so many people, you don't understand that you can't do evil to accomplish good, then you don't understand what the word "evil" means.

Labels: On torture

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Some questions for those whose need for a definition of torture has not yet been met

1. What are you going to do with your definition once you get it?
   
   I ask this because lexicographers, moral theologians, legislatures, courts, governments, and international bodies all have definitions that meet their needs.
   
   What specialized needs do you have that existing definitions don't meet?
   
   
2. Why can't you define it yourself?
   
   Who better than you to meet your own specialized need? And if you aren't capable of coming up with a definition, then you might ask yourself whether you're really capable of using it even if someone gave it to you.
   
   
3. Are you similarly paralyzed for want of definitions for other words?
   
   If you are one of the people who have been frozen in place for half a dozen years, unable to participate in the debate on torture until they're provided with an acceptable definition, are you also frozen out of debates on such things as terrorism (which the Catechism treats in the sentence immediately preceding its first mention of torture)? What, after all, is terrorism? When I was a child, I was terrified that my father would come home before I cleaned my room. Does that mean my father was a terrorist?
   
   Or what about gluttony? Some might try to define it as an inordinate desire of eating and drinking, but really, that's no definition at all. How much popcorn is "inordinate"? Ten kernels? A thousand? Where's the line? For a sick person, a single kernel may be too much. Is nothing but starving yourself to death moral?

Labels: On torture

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Torture roundup redux

In October 2006, I wrote a post that linked to the 26 posts on torture I'd written over the previous three and a half years.

In the not-quite three and a half years since, only the following 15 17 posts mention the ongoing torture debate:

• Too nice an argument
• Statics and dynamics
• Ick
• Disproportionate infliction of pain
• Proof, not construction
• An unobserved anniversary
• A real bomb
• Certain challenges
• A good case of Not Invented Here Syndrome
• Evil schmevil
• The Catechism's case for torture
• Execution, si; torture, no
• Just what the doctorate ordered
• It's never just the facts
• The more the moraller?
• The enemy of my enemy
• And finally, Sign me up

The topic of that last post, the brand-new Coalition for Clarity -- "because torture is intrinsically evil" -- is the motivation for this compilation.

(And right now, I don't want to think about what the next three and a half years might hold.)

Labels: On torture

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Sign me up

COALITION FOR CLARITY
Because Torture is Intrinsically Evil
Link via Catholic & Enjoying It!

Labels: On torture

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Two-fer

Scott Brown (R, MA) is pro-abortion and pro-torture. Why wouldn't Massachusetts Citizens for Life endorse him?

Too catty?

Scott Brown (R, MA) is pro-choice and pro-enhanced interrogation techniques. Why wouldn't Massachusetts Citizens for Life endorse him?

Better?

I'm not among those who insist an advocacy group ought to endorse only those candidates who endorse the group's whole platform. I get that the least bad choice is better than the greatest bad choice. I get that, in a place like Massachusetts, the least bad choice is likely to be pretty bad, and anything even approximating an electoral victory for a right-to-life group is likely to be pretty rare.

What I don't get is why you'd be giddy over the least bad choice's electoral victory. MCFL is daydreaming about the dreamy signs they'll bring to the March for Life tomorrow. Tomorrow, as in the anniversary of the Roe v. Wade decision, which MCFL's dreamy new senator endorses.

During the last presidential campaign, Zippy argued that political endorsements corrupted pro-life groups; he particularly had in mind how embryonic stem cell research disappeared from the list of life issues when a pro-life group endorsed John McCain. The same thing happened with MCFL in its endorsement of Scott Brown. What are the odds?

It's worse in the latter case, of course, since MCFL couldn't even bring itself to list "legal abortion" as a life issue.

Nor did it mention "constitutional amendment," even though just last month MCFL president Anne Fox wrote that being pro-life "implies support for a constitutional amendment" as a reason for not endorsing Jack E. Robinson -- who calls himself "personally pro-life" and agrees "that the law should protect the right to life of each human being from conception to natural death" -- in the Republican primary.

Anne Fox has asked for ideas for signs to carry at the March for Life. Here's mine:

MASSACHUSETTS
Now With 10% Less Evil
All it Costs is Your Soul
You're Welcome!

Too catty? How about this:

MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE
37 Years In & Brown's The Best We Can Do
Sorry
We'll Keep Trying

Labels: On torture

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